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Th   e term sovereign wealth fund (SWF) had not been coined 
a decade ago. By 2007, economists and the fi  nancial world 
were alternatively excited about or alarmed by the growing 
infl  uence of these institutions, though in fact many of them 
had been around for decades. Politicians in countries in which 
the funds invested generally welcomed the additional fi  nan-
cial resources from abroad while expressing concern about the 
motivations of investors and what they feared could be threats 
to political, economic, and fi   nancial security. Th  e general 
public in the countries in which the funds were based real-
ized at the same time that political leaders were investing large 
amounts of national wealth at home and abroad with limited 
disclosure, and they wanted to know more.
Following the global economic and fi   nancial crisis of 
2008–09, the highly publicized debate over SWFs died down, 
in part because the assets managed by the funds stopped 
growing as rapidly as many had predicted. In addition, the 
general public in both recipient and home countries learned 
more about the funds, and the authorities and managers 
responsible for SWFs in many countries took steps to demystify 
the funds. For example, in September 2008 the International 
Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds adopted a 
set of Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for SWFs 
in Santiago, Chile. Th   is framework is known as the Santiago 
Principles. Truman was an early advocate of greater transpar-
ency and accountability for SWFs and, in part with Bagnall, 
actively participated in subsequent reviews of progress.1 
Th   is Policy Brief provides an update on the transparency 
and accountability of SWFs based on the SWF scoreboard 
that Truman fi  rst developed in 2007 and subsequently refi  ned. 
For comparison, we have also scored the funds according to 
the Santiago Principles.2 Many SWFs, in particular funds 
associated with the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (IFSWF), which succeeded the IWG in 2009, have 
made substantial progress in responding to demands at home 
and abroad for greater transparency and accountability about 
their activities. However, that progress has not been uniform. 
Moreover, most of the newer SWFs appear not to be following 
the example of the best of the older funds. Th   e IFSWF also has 
fallen short in promoting the substantial adherence of some of 
its members to those principles.
Th  e highest scoring funds are those of Norway, New 
Zealand, Chile, the United States (Alaska), and Ireland. 
Norway’s Government Pension Fund–Global currently is the 
largest in the world as well as the highest ranking, but it is 
the only fund ranking in the top fi  ve that has more than $50 
billion in assets under management. Each of these funds, as 
well as six of the next seven high-ranking funds, is associated 
with the IFSWF. At the other end of the spectrum, three of fi  ve 
lowest-scoring funds, those of Qatar, Libya, and Equatorial 
Guinea, are also associated with the IFSWF, and the estimated 
1. See Truman (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2011) and Bagnall and 
Truman (2011).
2. Our scoring of SWFs on the Santiago Principles uses the elements of the 
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size of the Qatar Investment Authority is more than $100 
billion and of the Libyan Investment Authority more than 
$50 billion. Th   e IFSWF appears to have been broadly, but not 
universally, successful in raising global standards of transpar-
ency and accountability of SWFs.
In what follows, we fi  rst review updated estimates of the 
size of SWFs.3 We next present the 2012 SWF scoreboard 
including six funds that we have scored for the fi  rst time. We 
also examine the progress in accountability and transparency 
that has been achieved, on the basis of this standard, since 
2007. In addition, we compare results based on the Santiago 
Principles, and we look briefl  y at three other related indicators 
of transparency.
GROWTH OF SWFS
A rough estimate is that the total assets of SWF assets sextu-
pled between the end of 2002 and the end of 2007, at which 
point assets under management were $2.8 trillion (Truman 
2008c), on the IWG’s defi  nition of SWFs. Contemporary esti-
mates (Truman 2010, 17) were that they would have reached 
as much as $7.5 trillion by 2011, $12 trillion by 2015, and 
$17.5 trillion by 2017. Truman (2010, table 2.1) estimated 
3. In this Policy Brief, we employ the defi  nition of a SWF adopted by the 
International Working Group of SWFs (IWG 2008, 3). Th  at  defi  nition 
includes government pension reserve funds as SWFs. Th   ese are funds that are 
not directly linked to the fi  nancing of social security systems but are expected 
to be used for that purpose in the future. Th  e  defi  nition does not include other 
forms of government pension funds. However, we report some information on 
such funds in some of the tables that follow. Th   e IWG agreed: “SWFs are spe-
cial purpose investment funds or arrangements that are owned by the general 
government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, 
SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve fi  nancial objectives, and 
employ a set of investment strategies that include investing in foreign fi  nancial 
assets.” Th   e IWG noted that “general government includes both central govern-
ment and subnational government.” It added, “SWFs are commonly established 
out of balance of payments surpluses, offi   cial foreign currency operations, 
the proceeds of privatizations, fi  scal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from 
commodity exports.” Th   is language on the fi  nancial resources used to establish 
and expand SWFs is also found in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
Sixth Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (IMF 
2009).
total SWF assets in mid-2010 at $3.1 trillion, including $2.6 
trillion in foreign assets. As shown in table 1, estimated total 
SWF assets as of mid-2013 were $4.2 trillion, including $3.6 
trillion in foreign assets—increases of almost 40 percent from 
mid-2010.4 
Th   us, SWFs have not grown at the rate that was antici-
pated six years ago.5 Some have failed.6 Nevertheless, SWFs 
remain important international fi  nancial players; 18 SWFs 
have estimated assets of more than $50 billion, nine have 
assets of more than $100 billion, and fi  ve have assets of more 
than $300 billion. Consequently the accountability and trans-
parency of SWFs remain a matter of public concern in both 
host and home countries.
THE 2012 SWF SCOREBOARD
Table 2 presents a summary assessment of the accountability 
and transparency of 49 SWFs and nine government pension 
funds using the SWF scoreboard that Truman fi  rst developed 
in 2007, updated with the most recently available informa-
tion.7 In this new edition of the scoreboard, we include six new 
SWFs and dropped one SWF, as discussed below.8 Th  erefore, 
table 2 provides results for 49 SWFs and nine government 
pension funds for a total of 58 funds, which is fi  ve more than 
the 54 funds scored in the 2009 edition of the scoreboard. Th  e 
funds scored span 52 countries, 48 of which have SWFs, four 
with only government pension funds and fi  ve with both.
4. Th   e total fi  gure is essentially identical to the Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute (SWFI) estimate for June 2010, $4.1 trillion, scaled down by 25 
percent. See www.swfi  nstitute.org/fund-rankings (accessed July 1, 2013). Th  e 
SWFI estimates include some entities that do not fi  t the IWG defi  nition of 
SWFs. Based on the SWFI fi  gures for June 2013 the estimate in table 1 of 
total SWF assets is about 25 percent lower than the SWFI estimate of $5.5 
trillion.
5. Th   e SWFI estimates imply an increase in SWF assets of 59 percent over the 
six-year period. Interestingly, the imprecise proxy for SWF investments in the 
United States, the line in the US international investment position data “other 
foreign offi   cial assets,” implies a 90 percent increase in SWF investments in the 
United States over the same period.
6. We have dropped Papua New Guinea’s Mineral Resource Stabilization 
Fund, which has not been scored, from this tabulation in table 1 because it 
has failed; see Monk (2010). It is not the fi  rst, nor likely to be the last, SWF to 
have failed; domestic politics and poor design often defeat sound intentions.
7. Appendix A provides a description of the SWF-scoreboard approach, the 33 
individual elements included in the scoreboard, and how the scoreboard has 
evolved. Appendix B provides the 2012 scores for each of the 49 SWFs and 
nine government pension funds. Th   e assessment was completed in July 2013, 
using currently available information, but in many cases that information is 
from the end of 2012. Th   erefore, this scoreboard should be regarded as the 
2012 scoreboard, and the results in Truman (2010) as the 2009 scoreboard.
8. We treat the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account previously owned by Sudan 
as being owned by Sudan and South Sudan because that is the way we under-
stand the terms of the agreement to create a new country. However, there is 
not a lot of information on its activities.
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Table 1     SWF assets (billions of US dollars) 
Country Fund Total assets Foreign assets
Norway  Government Pension Fund-Global* 720 720
UAE (Abu Dhabi) Abu Dhabi Investment Authority* 627** 627**
China China Investment Corporation* 482 187
Hong Kong  Exchange Fund 359 334
Kuwait  Kuwait Investment Authority* 342 342
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation* 248** 248**
Singapore  Temasek Holdings* 174 122
Russia  National Welfare Fund and Reserve Fund* 171 171
Qatar  Qatar Investment Authority* 115** 115**
Australia  Future Fund (PR)* 88 61
Kazakhstan  National Fund 76 64
UAE (Dubai)  Investment Corporation of Dubai 70* 70*
UAE (Abu Dhabi) International Petroleum Investment Company 65 65
Korea  Korea Investment Corporation* 57 57
Libya  Libyan Investment Authority* 56** 56**
Algeria  Revenue Regulation Fund 55 55
UAE (Abu Dhabi) Mubadala Development Company 55 22**
Iran National Development Fund 54 18**
United States  Alaska Permanent Fund* 47 17
Malaysia  Khazanah Nasional* 40 4
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund* 35 35
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 30** 30**
United States Texas Permanent School Fund 29 8
New Zealand  Superannuation Fund (PR)* 23 18
Chile  Economic and Social Stabilization Fund* 22 22
Kazakhstan  National Investment Corp 20 20**
Canada  Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund* 17 7
Ireland  National Pensions Reserve Fund (PR)* 15 4**
Timor-Leste  Petroleum Fund* 13 13
UAE (Dubai)  Dubai International Capital 13** 12**
UAE (Dubai)  Istithmar World 12** 12**
Bahrain  Mumtalakat Holding Company 11** 9**
Oman  State General Reserve Fund 8* 8*
Chile  Pension Reserve Fund (PR)* 6 6
Mexico  Oil Income Stabilization Fund* 6 6
United Arab Emirates Emirates Investment Authority  6 6
United States  Permanent Mineral Trust Fund (Wyoming) 6 1
Brazil  Sovereign Wealth Fund of Brazil 5** 2**
Angola  Fundo Soberano de Angola 5** 5**
Botswana  Pula Fund* 5 5
Canada  Fonds des générations 5 2**
Trinidad and Tobago  Heritage and Stabilization Fund*  5 5
Peru Fiscal Stabilization Fund 4 4
United States  Severance Tax Permanent Fund (New Mexico) 4 0.5
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Table 1     SWF assets (billions of US dollars) (continued)
Country Fund Total assets Foreign assets
United States  Alabama Trust Fund 2 0.6
Colombia  Oil Stabilization Fund 2** 2**
UAE (Ras al Khaimah)  RAK Investment Authority 1** 1**
China Shanghai Financial Holdings 1** 1**
Nigeria  Sovereign Investment Authority 1 1
North Dakota Legacy Fund 1 1**
Ghana Ghana Petroleum Funds 0.9 .9**
Venezuela  National Development Fund 0.8** 0.8**
Venezuela  Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 0.8 0.8
Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation 0.7 0.7
Kiribati  Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 0.6* 0.6*
Turkmenistan Stabilization Fund  0.5** 0.5**
UAE (Dubai)  DIFC Investments  0.5** 0.5**
Gabon  Fund for Future Generations  0.4 0.4
Uganda  Poverty Action Fund 0.4** 0.4**
Indonesia Government Investment Unit of Indonesia 0.3 0.3
Mauritania  National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves 0.3 0.3
Mongolia Fiscal Stability Fund 0.3 0.3**
Panama Fondo de Ahorro de Panama 0.3 0.3**
São Tomé and Príncipe  National Oil Account 0.1** 0.1**
Sudan /South Sudan Oil Revenue Stabilization Account 0.1 0.1
Equatorial Guinea  Fund for Future* 0.08* 0.08*
Nauru  Phosphate Royalties Trust 0.06 0.06
Subtotal 4,221 3,609
    of which IFSWF members 3,384 2,869
     of which non-IFSWF members 837 740
Country Government pension funds Total Assets Foreign Assets
Japan Government Pension Investment Fund  1,293 292
Netherlands Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP  369 303**
United States  California Public Employees’ Retirement System 258 71
Canada  Canada Pension Plan  183 116
Canada Caisse de dépôt placement du Québec  176 75
China National Social Security Fund (China) 161 32**
Canada  Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan  130 60**
France  Fonds de réserve pour les retraites  48 32**
Thailand  Government Pension Fund (Thailand)  17 3**
Subtotal 2,635 984
Total 6,852 4,595
Note: Funds evaluated on the SWF scoreboard are italicized. 
* denotes International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) member.
** denotes estimate.
PR denotes a pension reserve fund.
Source: National and international reports.NUMBER PB13-19  AUGUST 2013
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Table 2     2012 SWF scoreboard
Country Fund Score
Norway Government Pension Fund-Global 98
New Zealand Superannuation Fund (PR) 94
Chile Economic and Social Stabilization Fund 91
United States Alaska Permanent Fund 91
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund (PR) 90
Australia Future Fund (PR) 89
United States Wyoming Permanent Mineral Trust Fund 89
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund 88
Canada Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 86
Chile Pension Reserve Fund (PR) 85
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 85
Trinidad and Tobago Heritage and Stabilization Fund 83
United States New Mexico Severance Tax Permanent Fund 79
Singapore Temasek Holdings 76
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 73
Kazakhstan National Fund 71
Hong Kong Exchange Fund 70
Korea Korea Investment Corporation 69
United States Alabama Trust Fund 67
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 66
United Arab Emirates Mubadala Development Company 65
China China Investment Corporation 64
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional 59
United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 58
Botswana Pula Fund 56
United Arab Emirates Dubai International Capital 55
Russia National Welfare Fund and Reserve Fund 53
São Tomé & Principe National Oil Account 48
Ghana Petroleum Funds 47
United Arab Emirates International Petroleum Investment Company 46
Mexico Oil Income Stabilization Fund 44
Iran National Development Fund 41
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company 39
Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation 38
Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 35
Brazil Sovereign Fund of Brazil 30
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 29
Venezuela National Development Fund 29
Oman State General Reserve Fund 27
Venezuela Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 27
Brunei Darussalam Brunei Investment Agency 21
United Arab Emirates Investment Corporation of Dubai 21
Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority 18
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Th  e scoreboard has 33 individual elements that are 
equally weighted and translated into a 100-point scale. Th  e 
average score for all funds (pension and nonpension) is 59. 
Th  e average for all funds is positively skewed by the nine 
pension funds’ average of 86; the average for the SWFs alone is 
54. Within the group of SWFs, the 26 funds that are members 
of the IFSWF average 65, and the 23 nonmembers average 42. 
As was the case with the 2009 scoreboard published 
in Truman (2010), the scores for the SWFs are distributed 
widely from a low of 2 for Equatorial Guinea’s Fund for 
Future Generations to a high of 98 for Norway’s Government 
Pension Fund–Global.9 Th   e funds do not fall into one high-
scoring group and another low-scoring group. Instead, 12 
9. Norway’s SWF has consistently scored at or near the top on the SWF 
scoreboards. Its score has increased from 97 on the 2009 scoreboard to 98 
because, in our judgment, it now has a clearly stated policy on the use of lever-
age (element 31). Th   e SWF does not receive a perfect score because we give it 
only partial credit for having a policy on the use of derivatives (element 32). 
Th   e SWF provides a great deal of information on its use of derivatives, but we 
could not fi  nd a statement of underlying policy in that area.
funds score above 80; 14 funds score 30 or below; and 23 
funds score more than 30 and 80 or less. 
Th   e evolution of the SWF scoreboard results since Truman 
published the fi  rst scoreboard in 2007 is discussed in some 
detail below. However, in brief, since the 2009 scoreboard 
(published in 2010), the number of SWFs scoring above 80 
has increased from 7 to 12. Conversely, the number of funds 
scoring 30 or below has also increased, from 13 to 14.10 Th  e 
principal reason for this increase in the number of low-scoring 
funds is that in the 2012 scoreboard we have scored six new 
funds, and fi  ve of them score 30 or less, including Nigeria’s 
new Sovereign Investment Authority, at 18, which is even 
lower than Nigeria’s liquidated Excess Crude Account that 
scored 29 in 2009.11 Th  e other newly scored funds include 
10. Table 5.1 in Truman (2010) lists the score for the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (ADIA) at 11, but text box 5.2 updated that score to 58, reducing 
the number of funds scoring 30 or less to 13.
11. Th   e Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority was established in 2011, 
and reportedly its board approved its investment policies in May 2013, but 
the Financial Times reported on June 25, 2103 (“Volatility Delays Investment 
Table 2     2012 SWF scoreboard (continued)
Country Fund Score
Sudan/South Sudan Oil Revenue Stabilization Account 18
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 17
United Arab Emirates Istithmar World 17
Angola Fundo Soberano de Angola 15
Libya Libyan Investment Authority 6
Equatorial Guinea  Fund for Future Generations 2
SWF average (49) 54
  IFSWF members (26) 65
  Non-IFSWF members (23) 42
Pension funds 
United States California Public Employees’ Retirement System  95
Canada Canada Pension Plan  93
France Fonds de réserve pour les retraites 93
Canada Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec 91
Japan Government Pension Investment Fund 86
Canada Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan 85
Netherlands Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP 85
Thailand Government Pension Fund 80
China National Social Security Fund 70
Pension fund average (9) 86
All funds average (58) 59
IFSWF = International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Note: The number of funds in each subgroup is indicated in the parentheses. PR denotes a 
pension reserve fund.
Source: Appendix B.NUMBER PB13-19  AUGUST 2013
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Equatorial Guinea’s Fund for Future Generations (2) and the 
Libyan Investment Authority (6). We could fi  nd essentially 
no reliable public information on these funds, which was not 
unexpected, but we wanted to include them because they 
are members of the IFSWF and, in principle, adhere to the 
Santiago Principles. 
We scored the new, as of 2009, Sovereign Fund of Brazil 
(30) because it has the potential to become very large. Brazil’s 
record on transparency has been uneven. Brazil released the 
annual International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff   report on its 
Article IV consultation for the fi  rst time only last year. And 
only in the past few years has Brazil begun to release IMF 
reports on the stability of its fi  nancial system. On the other 
hand, Brazil has subscribed to the Special Data Dissemination 
Standard and releases a considerable amount of information 
on its debt and fi  scal situation as well as on domestic infl  ation. 
We also scored the new (2011) Ghana Petroleum Funds 
(47) and Angola’s new (2012) Fundo Soberano de Angola (15) 
because both these funds are important as African extractive-
economy models. We were entirely not encouraged by the 
results. Th  e score of Ghana’s SWF places it in the middle 
group but below the average for all funds. Th   e creation of this 
SWF was politically controversial in Ghana, because societies 
are tempted to consume the wealth now before politicians can 
steal or misuse it; for that reason the government took care 
in establishing the Ghanaian SWF’s legal structure. But the 
subsequent evidence of careful implementation is skimpy.12 
We also wanted to score Mongolia’s Fiscal Stability Fund, 
established in 2011, because it could play a signifi  cant role in 
contributing to that country’s macroeconomic stability in the 
context of a boom in its commodity exports; however, there is 
from Nigeria Sovereign Wealth Fund”) (accessed July 22, 2013) that it has 
delayed making its initial investments. Th   is may explain why the SWF has yet 
to provide much information on its activities.
12. For example, the governing law requires both annual reports and semian-
nual reports, but the public record so far includes only semiannual reports by 
the Bank of Ghana. Th   ey focus more on tracing the funds fl  owing from the 
petroleum investments than on the deployment of the funds into the two com-
ponents of the SWF: a stabilization fund and a longer-term investment fund.
insuffi   cient information available to do any type of an assess-
ment of that fund.13
For each of the fi  ve newly scored SWFs with very low scores, 
it might be argued that there are extenuating circumstances. A 
more disturbing conclusion is that despite the availability of the 
Santiago Principles, to say nothing of the SWF scoreboard, to 
guide their policies on transparency and accountability, these 
funds have fallen substantially short, or continue to fall substan-
tially short, of many of their peers. It is also discouraging that 
only three of the SWFs that registered 30 or less on the 2009 
scoreboard have moved up signifi  cantly: Bahrain’s Mumtalakat 
Holding Company, whose score improved marginally to 
39,  Iran somewhat more to 41, and United Arab Emirates’ 
International Petroleum Investment Company, whose score 
increased to 46.
ASSESSING PROGRESS
Notwithstanding the apparent lack of progress in increasing 
the transparency and accountability of some SWFs, a number 
of SWFs have made substantial progress over the fi  ve years 
since the publication of the fi   rst SWF scoreboard, from 
2007 to 2012.14,15 Th   e upper panel of table 3 summarizes the 
progress of 32 SWFs and the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS). Th  e average total change 
in the score of these 32 SWFs is 17 percentage points. Th  e 
change in the score for CalPERS is 8 percentage points, from 
a higher 2007 score than for the 32 SWFs, suggesting that the 
trend toward greater transparency and accountability is not 
limited to SWFs. 
As can be seen from table 3, a number of funds made 
signifi   cant improvements in the entire 2007–12 period, 
led by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and 
the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, 
with increases of more than 50 percentage points each, and 
Chile’s Economic and Social Stabilization Fund, Trinidad 
and Tobago’s Heritage and Stabilization Fund, the Korea 
Investment Corporation, the UAE’s Mubadala Development 
Company, the China Investment Corporation, and the UAE’s 
13. Th   e same is true for the SWFs of Libya and Equatorial Guinea, but in 
those cases we wanted to establish the lack of information in connection with 
their membership in the IFSWF.
14. As described in appendix A, some adjustments in the SWF scoreboard 
were made between 2007 and 2009, which accounts for some of the minus 
signs in the 2007–09 column in the table. However, the results are broadly 
comparable; see Truman (2010, 89–91).
15. Th   e 2009 scores are slightly diff  erent from those published in Truman 
(2010) because we have included the score for the ADIA that appeared in the 
text boxes (5.2 and 6.1) and we have marginally adjusted the scores for a few 
elements for a few countries to make them consistent with the other 2009 
scores.
Notwithstanding the apparent lack of 
progress in increasing the transparency and 
accountability of some SWFs, a number of 
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Table 3     Progress on SWF transparency and accountability
Change in percentage points
Country Fund 2012 score 2009–12 2007–09 2007–12
Funds first scored in 2007
Norway Government Pension Fund-Global 9 8 156
New Zealand Superannuation Fund (PR) 9 4 022
Chile Economic and Social Stabilization Fund 91 9 20 29
United States Alaska Permanent Fund 91 0 19 19
Australia Future Fund (PR) 89 9 12 21
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund 88 12 10 22
Canada Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 86 13 –5 8
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 85 0 –2 –2
Trinidad and Tobago Heritage and Stabilization Fund 83 0 34 34
Singapore Temasek Holdings 76 3 19 22
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 73 10 15 25
Kazakhstan National Fund 71 6 7 13
Korea Korea Investment Corporation 69 9 24 33
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 66 1 56 57
United Arab Emirates Mubadala Development Company 65 6 45 51
China China Investment Corporation 64 7 33 40
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional 59 15 6 21
United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 58 0 56 56
Botswana Pula Fund 56 0 –2 –2
Russia National Welfare Fund and Reserve Fund 53 3 12 15
São Tomé & Principe National Oil Account 48 0 –1 –1
Mexico Oil Income Stabilization Fund 44 0 16 16
Iran National Development Fund 41 12 7 19
Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 35 0 5 5
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 29 0 11 11
Venezuela National Development Fund 29 2 3 5
Oman State General Reserve Fund 27 4 3 7
Venezuela Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 27 0 5 5
Brunei Darussalam Brunei Investment Agency 21 0 11 11
Sudan/South Sudan Oil Revenue Stabilization Account 18 0 –2 –2
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 1 7 279
United Arab Emirates Istithmar World 17 0 2 2
Average 59 4 14 17
Memo: United States California Public Employees’ Retirement System  95 0 8 8
Funds first scored in 2009
Canada Canada Pension Plan  93 1
France Fonds de réserve pour les retraites 93 4
Canada Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec 91 2
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund (PR) 90 4
United States Wyoming Permanent Mineral Trust Fund 89 0
Japan Government Pension Investment Fund 86 2
Chile Pension Reserve Fund (PR) 85 17
Canada Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan 85 2
(continues)NUMBER PB13-19  AUGUST 2013
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International Petroleum Investment Company, with increases 
of 20 percentage points or more each. 
A number of the SWFs with substantial increases in their 
scores over the entire period have also made substantial prog-
ress over the past three years.16 Th   ese include Azerbaijan’s State 
Oil Fund, Alberta Canada’s Heritage Savings Trust Fund, the 
Kuwait Investment Authority, Malaysia’s Khazanah Nasional, 
Iran’s National Development Fund, and, as shown in the lower 
panel, Chile’s Pension Reserve Fund and the UAE’s International 
Petroleum Investment Company, each with an increase of at 
least 10 percentage points. In general, larger increases in scores 
were recorded in the 2007–09 period, when the SWF issue was 
hot and pressure on SWFs to be more transparent and account-
able was signifi  cant.
Table 4 presents changes in scores from the vantage point 
of the 24 individual elements that have been common to each 
of the SWF scoreboards for the 32 SWFs that have been scored 
since 2007. Th   is allows us to measure the areas of improvement 
over time for the funds that we’ve been scoring since the initial 
edition of the scoreboard in 2007. Th   e table also provides some 
perspective on the relative scores on these elements for all funds 
as of 2012. 
Th   e average for the 24 elements is 60 (out of 100), which is 
close to the average score of 54 for all 33 elements in 2012. It is 
16. Of course, the room for improvement for some funds was limited. Th  ree 
of the 32 SWFs scored at 85 or above in the 2007 SWF scoreboard, and seven 
did so in the 2009 scoreboard.
not surprising that the highest scores for individual elements are 
those for a clear statement of an SWF’s objective and its source 
of funding, followed by the role of managers in the fund, having 
a clear process for changing the fund’s structure, and the size of 
the fund. Th   e last element is not required or recommended by 
the Santiago Principles though 75 percent of these 32 SWFs 
and currently 80 percent of the 49 funds in the 2012 scoreboard 
release at least some information about their size.17 Th  e  lowest 
scores are recorded for elements on whether an SWF has a 
publicly stated guideline on the nature and speed of the adjust-
ment in its portfolio, which would help to limit market disrup-
tion, and whether it has a publicly stated guideline for ethical 
investment, which would govern what types of investments the 
SWF does not undertake. What may be most surprising about 
the scores on these 24 elements is how dispersed they are. Th  is 
dispersion of behavior of the individual funds emphasizes a 
basic feature of the SWF scoreboard: Each element has been 
adopted by at least one fund.18 
Not so surprisingly, most of the improvement in scores 
on the individual elements was during the 2007–09 period, 
with substantially less since 2009. Th   e most substantial overall 
improvements, based on changes in percentage points, were 
with respect to clarity about how a fund’s structure can be 
changed, identifying the holders of investment mandates, 
17. Ten funds release no information.
18. In fact, among the 49 funds, the minimum number is six practitioners for 
the speed of adjustment and 11 for having ethical investment guidelines.




Country Fund 2012 score 2009–12
                                                                              Funds first scored in 2009 (continued)
Netherlands Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP 85 0
Thailand Government Pension Fund 80 2
United States New Mexico Severance Tax Permanent Fund 79 0
Hong Kong Exchange Fund 70 0
China National Social Security Fund 70 0
United States Alabama Trust Fund 67 0
United Arab Emirates Dubai International Capital 55 0
United Arab Emirates International Petroleum Investment Company 46 20
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company 39 9
Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation 38 3
United Arab Emirates Investment Corporation of Dubai 21 0
Average 72 3
Notes: Funds associated with the IFSWF (International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds) are italicized. PR denotes 
a pension reserve fund.
Sources: Appendix B and Truman (2010, 2008b).NUMBER PB13-19  AUGUST 2013
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publishing audits, and publishing information on the returns 
of funds. In the more recent period, the most substantial 
improvements were with respect to providing information 
on the currency composition of investments, having ethical 
investment guidelines, and publishing audits.
THE SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES
Th   is section compares the 2012 performance of the 49 SWFs 
and nine pension funds on the SWF scoreboard to the Santiago 
Principles. Th   e Santiago Principles include 30 principles and 
subprinciples. Th   ey overlap with 25 of the 33 elements in the 
Table 4     Comparison of 24 SWF scoreboard elements
Change in percentage points
Element 2102 score 2009–12 2007–09 2007–12
Structure
Objective stated 97 3 6 9
Changes in structure 78 3 35 38
Investment strategy 75 7 15 22
Source of funding 88 0 8 8
Use of fund earnings 59 1 6 7
Integrated with policies 62 0 8 8
Separate from international reserves 72 0 0 0
Average 76 2 11 12
Governance
Role of government 75 2 20 22
Role of managers 77 0 7 7
Guidelines for corporate responsibility 28 9 5 14
 Ethical investment guidelines 21 10 2 12
Average 50 5 9 14
Accountability and transparency
Categories of investments 69 5 21 26
Mandates identified 50 0 33 33
Size of fund 75 0 7 7
Returns of fund 59 4 22 26
Location of investments 48 7 16 23
Specific investments 30 7 12 19
Currency composition  44 11 7 18
Annual reports 67 1 22 23
Quarterly reports 41 2 8 10
Regular audits 74 2 17 19
Published audits 54 10 20 30
Independent audits 72 5 12 17
Average 57 5 16 21
Behavior
Portfolio adjustment 11 0 6 6
Overall average 60 4 13 17
Sources: Appendix B and Truman (2010, 2008b).NUMBER PB13-19  AUGUST 2013
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SWF scoreboard; see Truman, (2010, appendix 6A) for the 
correspondence.19 Alternatively, 16 of the 24 major Santiago 
Principles overlap with one or more of the elements in the 
SWF scoreboard. Table 5 presents the scores of the SWFs and 
government pension funds on the SWF scoreboard and two 
versions of the Santiago Principles: 25 and 16 elements.20 
Th  e rankings of funds are broadly similar. In fact, 
the simple correlation of the scoreboard scores with the 25 
elements included in the Santiago Principles is 0.9912, and 
the correlation with the 16 elements is 0.9609. Th  e average 
score on the Santiago principles is 3 to 5 percentage points 
higher, but this diff   erence is not statistically signifi  cant.21 
Interestingly the higher average score is essentially the same 
for the 26 funds that are associated with the IFSWF, which 
sponsors the Santiago Principles, as for the 23 funds that are 
not. One might expect that the funds that are associated with 
the IFSWF would be more inclined to tailor their adherence 
to international standards in the direction of the Santiago 
Principles, rather than the independent SWF scoreboard. 
Seven SWFs record slightly lower scores on the 
25-element version of the Santiago Principles than on the 
SWF scoreboard, and 12 funds have lower scores on the 
16-element version of the Santiago Principles. Only three 
funds stand out with scores on the 25-element version of the 
Santiago principles that are 10 percentage points or more 
higher than on the SWF scoreboard: the Government of 
Singapore Investment Corporation, the ADIA, and São Tomé 
and Principe’s National Oil Account. Th   ey are joined on the 
16-element version by the China Investment Corporation, 
Dubai International Capital, Kiribati’s Revenue Equalization 
Reserve Fund, and the Fundo Soberano de Angola. On the 
whole, the tale of transparency and accountability told by the 
SWF scoreboard and that told by the Santiago Principles are 
very similar. Th  e principal diff  erence is the improvement in 
performance, as of 2012, of those funds that are associated 
with the IFSWF and those that are not.
Returning to table 3, the 24 funds associated with the 
IFSWF are identifi  ed in italics.22 Four of the funds already 
19. In fact, some elements from the Santiago Principles were incorporated into 
the SWF scoreboard when it was revised in 2010; see appendix A. Th  e  drafters 
of the Santiago Principles also were aware of the guidance off  ered to them in 
Truman (2008).
20. In the latter case, the scores of more than one element on the SWF 
scoreboard are averaged to produce a composite score for one of the Santiago 
Principles; see Truman (2010, appendix 6A).
21. A small bias is introduced into the scoring because with a smaller number 
of elements each element that receives a score of 1.0 has a larger value on a 
scale of 100. Th   is may, in part, explain the fact that the nine pension funds 
also score higher on the two versions of the Santiago Principles and by a 
similar margin of 3 percentage points.
22. Th   e website of the IFSWF associates two funds in Singapore and two in 
Chile with those countries’ membership. (Note: we scored two of the 26 SWFs 
had received high scores in the earliest editions of the SWF 
scoreboard; they did not have much room to improve because 
their scores at the start were 85 or above, though most scores 
did increase marginally.23 Th   irteen of the funds have recorded 
increases in their scores of 20 percentage points or more, 
in either the 2007–12 period or just the 2009–12 period, 
and only two of those were not directly associated with the 
IFSWF: Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala Development Company and 
its International Petroleum Investment Company.24 
Considering only the 32 SWFs that were fi  rst scored in 
2007, the 21 funds that now are associated with the IFSWF 
had an average SWF scoreboard score at that time of 49, 
which has increased 21 percentage points on average to 71 in 
2012. In contrast, the 11 funds that are not associated with 
the IFSWF had a lower average score of 25 in 2007, and a 
more modest 10 percentage point average increase to 35 in 
2012. Of the 49 SWFs scored in 2012, 26 were recorded 
above the mean of 54, of which 19 (73 percent) are associ-
ated with the IFSWF. Of the 23 recorded below the mean, 
only 7 (30 percent) were associated with the IFSWF. Th  us, 
we can conclude that association with the IFSWF appears to 
have served as an incentive for a number of funds to improve 
their performance.
On the other hand, the seven IFSWF funds that are now 
below the average for all SWFs are problematic in diff  erent 
degrees.25 Th   e funds of Russia and Mexico have boosted their 
SWF scores by 15 and 16 percentage points, respectively, since 
2007 but remain below the mean. Th  e scores for the other 
four SWFs associated with the IFSWF started out at 30 or 
associated with the IFSWF for the fi  rst time only in the 2012 scoreboard.) 
Conversely, in the case of the United Arab Emirates and the United States, 
which have multiple SWFs that we have scored, only one is associated with 
each of those countries on the website. Th   ese funds are the ADIA and Alaska 
Permanent Fund, respectively.
23. Th   e exception is Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund, where a slight decline is 
recorded, refl  ecting changes in elements in the scoreboard.
24. Of the six SWFs associated with the UAE, three are linked to Abu Dhabi 
and three to Dubai (Dubai International Capital, Investment Corporation of 
Dubai, and Istithmar World). Th   e average for the three Abu Dhabi funds on 
the 2012 SWF scoreboard is 56 and each has improved its score. Th  e  average 
for the three Dubai funds is 31, with only Dubai International Capital, at 55, 
about the average for all SWFs. All of the Abu Dhabi funds have improved 
their initial scores. Only Istithmar World, among the Dubai funds, has 
recorded a marginal improvement. It would appear that there has been some 
positive “neighborhood eff  ect” in Abu Dhabi. In contrast, we fi  nd no such 
neighborhood eff  ect among the fi  ve US funds that we have scored, CalPERS 
and four subnational SWFs. Only the Alaska Permanent Fund is linked to the 
IFSWF. Both CalPERS and the Alaska fund have improved their scores since 
2007 when they were fi  rst scored, by 8 percentage points to 95 for CalPERS 
and by 19 percentage points to 91 for Alaska; the scores for the other three 
US subnational SWFs are unchanged from 2009 when they were fi  rst scored, 
averaging 78, 13 percentage points less than Alaska’s SWF; see table 3.
25. It does not matter whether the SWF scoreboard, the 25 Santiago 
Principles, or the 16 Santiago Principles are used to rate these funds, the aver-
ages come out about the same at 27, 28, and 27, respectively.NUMBER PB13-19  AUGUST 2013
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Table 5     2012 SWF scoreboard and the Santiago Principles
  Santiago Principles
Country Fund Scoreboard 25 elements 16 elements
Norway Government Pension Fund-Global 98 98 99
New Zealand Superannuation Fund (PR) 94 98 97
Chile Economic and Social Stabilization Fund 91 92 92
United States Alaska Permanent Fund 91 94 91
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund (PR) 90 94 85
Australia Future Fund (PR) 89 96 96
United States Wyoming Permanent Mineral Trust Fund 89 94 93
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund 88 90 87
Canada Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 86 90 89
Chile Pension Reserve Fund (PR) 85 86 83
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 85 80 73
Trinidad and Tobago Heritage and Stabilization Fund 83 82 81
United States New Mexico Severance Tax Permanent Fund 79 78 68
Singapore Temasek Holdings 76 82 84
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 73 77 85
Kazakhstan National Fund 71 75 78
Hong Kong Exchange Fund 70 74 71
Korea Korea Investment Corporation 69 76 77
United States Alabama Trust Fund 67 74 69
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 66 79 82
United Arab Emirates Mubadala Development Company 65 70 72
China China Investment Corporation 64 70 79
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional 59 64 69
United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 58 71 78
Botswana Pula Fund 56 62 64
United Arab Emirates Dubai International Capital 55 62 73
Russia National Welfare Fund and Reserve Fund 53 56 49
São Tomé & Principe National Oil Account 48 58 60
Ghana Petroleum Funds 47 54 54
United Arab Emirates International Petroleum Investment Company 46 47 53
Mexico Oil Income Stabilization Fund 44 42 40
Iran National Development Fund 41 48 45
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company 39 43 39
Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation 38 42 45
Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 35 44 54
Brazil Sovereign Fund of Brazil 30 32 36
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 29 32 32
Venezuela National Development Fund 29 27 30
Oman State General Reserve Fund 27 32 32
Venezuela Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 27 28 25
Brunei Darussalam Brunei Investment Agency 21 28 25
United Arab Emirates Investment Corporation of Dubai 21 22 19
Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority 18 24 23
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lower and—with the exception of Iran’s successor National 
Development Fund, which has recorded an increase of 19 
percentage points to a still-low total, and Bahrain’s Mumtalakat 
Holding Company, which has recorded a small increase of 9 
percentage points—are still below 30 as of 2012. In the case 
of two funds, those of Libya and Equatorial Guinea, perhaps 
the low scores and lack of improvement is not surprising, given 
political conditions in those countries. In the cases of Bahrain’s 
Mumtalakat Holding Company and the Qatar Investment 
Authority (QIA), the limited improvement is decidedly 
disappointing. 
Th   e score for Bahrain’s SWF has increased 9 points since 
2009. Public information about its structure and governance 
remains meager though it does a bit better on the elements 
relating directly to transparency and accountability in its 
operations. (See appendix B.) With respect to transparency, 
its website states, “We always maintain the highest standards 
of international corporate governance and openness.” Th  e 
website also notes its score of 9 out of 10 on the Linaburg-
Maduell Transparency Index for Sovereign Wealth Funds. 
Th  e QIA is associated in the press with a number of 
high-profi  le investments through Qatar Holding, a subsidiary. 
Th   ese investments include ownership of Harrods and stakes in 
Barclays Bank (which has sparked controversy), Volkswagen, 
and Credit Suisse. With more than $100 billion in estimated 
assets under management, fi  nancial market participants and 
the citizens of Qatar as well as the citizens of host countries to 
the QIA’s investments are justifi  ed to expect more transparency 
and accountability. Qatar Holding announced on February 
19, 2013 that it would seek a credit rating.26 Doing so would 
require more disclosure of the fund’s activities, but that has not 
yet occurred. Moreover, the website of QIA contains very little 
or no information germane to either the SWF scoreboard or 
the Santiago Principles. It declares, “As usual with many global 
investment institutions which are not listed on the public 
markets, the QIA does not publish fi  nancial information. We 
are acknowledged, however, as a well resourced, responsible 
26. See “Qatar Holding to see Credit Rating, Didn’t have Debt Last Year,” 
http://www.qatarholding.qa/Media%20Center/QH%20News/Pages/
QHSeeksCreditRate.aspx (accessed July 16, 2013).
Table 5     2012 SWF scoreboard and the Santiago Principles (continued)
  Santiago Principles
Country Fund Scoreboard 25 elements 16 elements
Sudan/South Sudan Oil Revenue Stabilization Account 18 16 16
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 17 17 20
United Arab Emirates Istithmar World 17 16 19
Angola Fundo Soberano de Angola 15 20 27
Libya Libyan Investment Authority 6 7 5
Equatorial Guinea  Fund for Future Generations 2 2 2
SWF average (49) 54 58 58
   IFSWF members (26) 65 68 69
  Non-IFSWF members (23) 42 46 47
Pension funds 
United States California Public Employees’ Retirement System  95 96 96
Canada Canada Pension Plan  93 97 96
France Fonds de réserve pour les retraites 93 93 95
Canada Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec 91 98 97
Japan Government Pension Investment Fund 86 89 91
Canada Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan 85 88 91
Netherlands Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP 85 84 87
Thailand Government Pension Fund 80 83 84
China National Social Security Fund 70 74 68
Pension fund average (9) 86 89 89
All funds average (59) 59 63 63
IFSWF = International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Note: The number of funds in each subgroup is indicated in the parentheses. PR denotes a pension reserve fund.
Source: Appendix B.NUMBER PB13-19  AUGUST 2013
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investor, as manifested by our track record of transactions.” 
Such a claim is impossible to substantiate without supporting 
documentation. In this case, the Linaburg-Maduell rating 
provides less of an endorsement, at 5 out of 10, but that rela-
tive score is still substantially higher than the QIA receives on 
the SWF scoreboard or the Santiago Principles.
What are we to conclude about the IFSWF and the 
Santiago Principles? It is a mixed story so far. First, the 
Santiago Principles were a compromise and, as a result, are 
not as rigorous as outsiders would prefer. For example, they 
are not explicit about what information should be publicly 
disclosed. In addition, 10 of the 30 Santiago Principles and 
subprinciples have little to do with the public and, rather, 
focus on relations between the fund and its government. 
Managers of SWFs, like central bankers that are often their 
philosophical cousins if not their de facto brothers and sisters, 
treasure their independence from their governments, which is 
a questionable long-term posture for both. 
Also, as part of the 2008 compromise, the Santiago 
Principles do not call for SWFs to disclose their size, though 
about 80 percent of funds do so. Th  ey also are silent about 
the need to distinguish between SWF funds and international 
reserves; about 60 percent of SWFs make that distinction. 
Th  ey do not call for disclosure of the currency composition 
of investments although more than a third of all SWFs do so. 
Th  ey are silent on providing information on specifi  c invest-
ments, but one-third of funds do so. And they do not advocate 
that SWF audits be published despite the fact that more than 
50 percent of all SWFs and two-thirds of funds associated 
with the IFSWF do so. Given that SWF transparency is of 
primary concern to citizens in SWF home and investment 
host countries, we consider these points of nondisclosure to be 
of considerable importance. Th   e size of a fund is an indication 
of its potential infl  uence; information on reserves, currency 
composition, and investment suggest how the fund is trans-
parent and accountable in its management of that infl  uence. 
Second, however, it would appear from the results 
presented above that association with the IFSWF has provided 
an incentive to a number of funds to increase their transpar-
ency and accountability. On the other hand, not all funds 
associated with the IFSWF have responded to such incentives, 
and progress among nonmembers lags substantially behind 
progress among members. 
Th  ird, it is gratifying that Malaysia and its Khazanah 
Nasional have recently quietly joined the IFSWF; a search 
of the internet turned up no announcement of that deci-
sion, but they are listed as members on the IFSWF website. 
Nevertheless, three economies with SWFs with estimated 
assets under management of more than $50 billion have not 
joined the IFSWF: Kazahkstan’s National Fund, Hong Kong’s 
Exchange Fund, and Algeria’s Revenue Regulation Fund. Th  e 
fi  rst and second register a reasonably respectable 71 and 70, 
respectively, on the SWF scoreboard, and the third is at 32. 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER TRANSPARENCY 
INDEXES
Neither the Santiago Principles nor the SWF scoreboard is the 
only game in town when it comes to assessing the transparency 
and accountability of SWFs or the countries with which they 
are associated. In this fi  nal section, we look at the correlation 
between the SWF scoreboard measure of transparency and 
accountability of SWFs and the March 2013 Linaburg-Maduell 
Transparency Index for SWFs associated with the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute, the Revenue Watch Institute’s 2013 
Resource Governance Index, and Transparency International’s 
2012 Corruption Perceptions Index. Table 6 presents results 
from the 2012 SWF scoreboard for the 49 SWFs along with 
comparable results on the Linaburg-Maduell index, where 
available for the SWF, and on the Revenue Watch Institute’s 
index and the Transparency International index where avail-
able for the home country.
Th  e scores on the three indexes are strongly correlated 
with the SWF scoreboard results at a very high level of signifi  -
cance.27 Th  is result is not surprising. Th  e high correlation is 
also somewhat reassuring because each index looks at the SWF 
elephant and its sponsoring country from a slightly diff  erent 
perspective. 
Truman (2010, 94–96) is critical of the Lindburg-
Maduell index for being superfi  cial in some of its 10 elements 
(such as: Does the fund have a website?), not releasing the 
resulting scores for each element, and for combining many 
factors into some elements, such as portfolio value, returns, 
and management compensation, without providing any 
information about how the factors were weighted within each 
element. Although the Linaburg-Maduell index yields results 
that are broadly similar to the SWF scoreboard, it assigns high 
scores, relative to the SWF scoreboard, to the SWFs of Korea, 
Bahrain, Brazil, Qatar, and three funds of the United Arab 
Emirates, and relatively low scores to Singapore’s Temasek and 
the SWF of Kiribati.
Th   e Revenue Watch Institute’s country index rates highly, 
again relative to the scoreboard for one or more of their SWFs, 
Ghana, Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Angola, and 
the reverse for Azerbaijan, Timor-Leste, and Kuwait. On 
the other hand Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index rates relatively highly the United Arab 
27. Th   e simple correlation coeffi   cients with the SWF scoreboard are 0.8049, 
0.6067, and 0.6007, respectively. Each is signifi  cant at the 1 percent level. In 
the case of the Revenue Watch and Transparency International indexes, the 
scores for SWFs from the same country were averaged before calculating the 
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Norway Government Pension Fund-Global 98 10 98 85
New Zealand Superannuation Fund (PR) 94 10 n.a. 90
Chile Economic and Social Stabilization Fund 91 10 75 72
United States Alaska Permanent Fund 91 10 92 73
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund (PR) 90 10 n.a. 69
Australia Future Fund (PR) 89 10 85 85
United States Wyoming Permanent Mineral Trust Fund 89 9 92 73
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund 88 10 48 27
Canada Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 86 9 76 84
Chile Pension Reserve Fund (PR) 85 10 75 77
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 85 8 68 33
Trinidad and Tobago Heritage and Stabilization Fund 83 8 74 39
United States New Mexico Severance Tax Permanent Fund 79 9 92 73
Singapore Temasek Holdings 76 10 n.a. 87
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 73 6 41 44
Kazakhstan National Fund 71 8 57 28
Hong Kong Exchange Fund 70 8 n.a. 77
Korea Korea Investment Corporation 69 9 n.a. 56
United States Alabama Trust Fund 67 n.a. 92 73
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 66 6 n.a. 87
United Arab Emirates Mubadala Development Company 65 10 n.a. 68
China China Investment Corporation 64 7 73 39
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional 59 5 46 49
United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 58 5 n.a. 68
Botswana Pula Fund 56 6 47 65
United Arab Emirates Dubai International Capital 55 n.a. n.a. 68
Russia National Welfare Fund and Reserve Fund 53 5 56 28
São Tomé & Principe National Oil Account 48 n.a. n.a. 42
Ghana Petroleum Funds 47 n.a. 63 45
United Arab Emirates International Petroleum Investment Company 46 9 n.a. 68
Mexico Oil Income Stabilization Fund 44 n.a. 77 34
Iran National Development Fund 41 5 28 28
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company 39 9 47 51
Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation 38 4 41 31
Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 35 1 n.a. n.a.
Brazil Sovereign Fund of Brazil 30 9 80 73
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 29 1 38 34
Venezuela National Development Fund 29 n.a. 56 19
Oman State General Reserve Fund 27 4 n.a. 47
Venezuela Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 27 1 56 19
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 21 1 n.a. 55
United Arab Emirates Investment Corporation of Dubai 21 4 n.a. 68
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Emirates, Oman, Brunei, Qatar, and Equatorial Guinea, and 
the reverse for Ireland, Azerbaijan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, China, and Russia. One inter-
pretation of the lack of complete congruity in these assess-
ments is that countries in the fi   rst groups perform below 
expectations with respect to transparency and accountability 
in setting up their SWFs based on other indicators and coun-
tries in the second groups perform above expectations.
CONCLUSION
Th  e growth of SWFs had slowed in recent years. However, 
with estimated total assets under management of $4.2 trillion, 
including an estimated $3.6 trillion in foreign assets, as of 
mid-2013, they are collectively major players in international 
fi  nancial markets (table 1). With 18 funds with estimated 
assets of more than $50 billion, nine funds with assets of more 
$100 billion, and fi  ve funds with assets of more than $300 
billion, the activities of many funds are a potential source of 
continuing interest as well as potential concern.
On the 2012 SWF scoreboard, the average for 49 funds 
is 54 out of 100 (table 2). For a common group of 32 funds, 
the average is 59, up from 42 on the 2007 scoreboard (table 3). 
Th   is 40 percent improvement is signifi  cant. However, progress 
has not been uniform, and the ratings of individual funds, while 
higher on average, remain widely dispersed. Progress has been 
concentrated almost exclusively in funds associated with the 
IFSWF.
Th   e SWFs of the remaining members of the IFSWF have 
low scores on both the SWF scoreboard and the Santiago 
Principles with limited changes. While excuses might be made 
for Equatorial Guinea and Libya, the same cannot be said for 
Russia, Mexico, Iran, Bahrain, and Qatar. Th  ey had below 
average scores when they were fi  rst rated, and they have lagged 
behind other SWFs in any subsequent improvements. Th  e 
case of Qatar, with an extremely low initial score and essen-
tially no improvement over fi  ve years, is particularly troubling. 
Qatar fancies itself as a major political, economic, and fi  nan-
cial player, and as such should hold itself to a high standard.
In addition to scoring the SWFs of Libya and Equatorial 
Guinea for the fi  rst time, we also scored the new SWFs of 
Angola, Brazil, Ghana, and Nigeria. With the exception of 
the Ghanaian SWF, each of these funds recorded 30 or less on 
the 2012 scoreboard and not signifi  cantly higher on the less 
demanding Santiago Principles. Brazil and Ghana score at 
above, or close to, the mean for the Revenue Watch Institute’s 
Resource Governance Index and Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index, respectively, which makes the 
ratings on the SWF scoreboard for their funds all the more 
disappointing. Nigeria and Angola score not far from the mean 
of the Resource Governance Index.
Th  e Santiago Principles and the IFSWF appear to have 
had limited infl  uence on these countries. Th  e IFSWF needs 
to strengthen its outreach to its low-performing members, to 
countries with new SWFs, and to the several countries with 
large funds (such as those of Hong Kong, Kazakhstan, and 
Algeria) that have yet to adhere to the Santiago Principles.
Progress has been made in increasing the transparency 
and accountability of SWFs, but more is needed.













Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority 18 n.a. 42 27
Sudan/South Sudan Oil Revenue Stabilization Account 18 n.a. 31 13
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 17 5 26 68
United Arab Emirates Istithmar World 17 n.a. n.a. 68
Angola Fundo Soberano de Angola 15 n.a. 42 22
Libya Libyan Investment Authority 6 1 11 21
Equatorial Guinea  Fund for Future Generations 2 n.a. 13 20
n.a. = score not available for this index.
Note:  PR denotes a pension reserve fund.
Sources: Appendix B and Revenue Watch Institute (2013), Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2013), and Transparency International (2012).NUMBER PB13-19  AUGUST 2013
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APPENDIX A SCOREBOARD FOR SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH FUNDS
Th  is appendix provides brief descriptions of the individual 
elements of the SWF scoreboard. Th   e scoreboard has evolved 
since the fi   rst edition in 2007, as summarized below. See 
Truman (2010, chapter 5) for more discussion.
For each of the 33 elements, posed as questions, if the 
answer is an unqualifi  ed yes, we score it as 1. If the answer is 
no, we score it as 0. However, partial scores of 0.25, 0.50, and 
0.75 are recorded for many elements, indicated by (p) in the 
descriptions below.
Th   e four categories in the scoreboard are listed below with 
subcategories where relevant. Th   e words in bold are keyed to 
the presentation of results in appendix B.
STRUCTURE
1. Is the SWF’s objective clearly stated? (p)
2. Is there a clear legal framework for the SWF? Th  is  element 
was incorporated into the 2008 scoreboard from the Santiago 
Principles.
3. Is the procedure for changing the structure of the SWF 
clear? (p)
4. Is the overall investment strategy clearly stated? (p)
Fiscal Treatment
5. Is the source of the SWF’s funding clearly specifi  ed? (p)
6. Is the nature of the subsequent use of the principal and 
earnings of the fund clearly specifi  ed? (p)
7. Are the SWF’s operations appropriately integrated with 
fi  scal and monetary policies?28 (p)
8. Is the SWF  separate from  the country’s international 
reserves?29
GOVERNANCE
9. Is the role of the government in setting the investment 
strategy of the SWF clearly established? (p)
28. Because this element is only marginally relevant to government pension 
funds and subnational SWFs, we give them an arbitrary score of 0.5 on it so as 
not to bias their results upward.
29. Because this element is not relevant to government pension funds and 
subnational SWFs, we give them an arbitrary score of 0.5 on it so as not to 
bias their results upward.
10. Is the role of the governing body of the SWF clearly 
established? (p) Th   is element was incorporated into the 2008 
scoreboard from the Santiago Principles.
11. Is the role of the managers in executing the investment 
strategy clearly established? (p)
12. Are decisions on specifi  c  investments  made by the 
managers? (p)
13. Does the SWF have internal ethical standards for its 
management and staff  ? (p) Th   is element was incorporated into 
the 2008 scoreboard from the Santiago Principles.
14. Does the SWF have in place, and make publicly available, 
guidelines for corporate responsibility that it follows? (p)




16. Do regular reports on investments by the SWF include 
information on the categories of investments? (p)
17. Does the strategy use benchmarks? (p)
18. Does the strategy use credit ratings? (p)
19. Are the holders of investment mandates identifi  ed? (p)
Investment Activities
20. Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include 
the size of the fund? (p)
21. Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include 
information on its returns? (p)
22. Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include 
information on the geographic location of investments? (p)
23. Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include 
information on the specifi  c investments? (p)
24. Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include 
information on the currency composition of investments? (p)
Reports
25. Does the SWF provide at least an annual report on its 
activities and results? (p)




27. Is the SWF subject to a regular annual audit? (p)
28. Does the SWF  publish promptly the audits of its 
operations and accounts? (p)
29. Are the audits independent? (p)
BEHAVIOR
30. Does the SWF have an operational risk management 
policy? Th   is element was incorporated into the 2008 
scoreboard from the Santiago Principles.
31. Does the SWF have a policy on the use of leverage? (p)
32. Does the SWF have a policy on the use of derivatives? (p)
33. Does the SWF have a guideline on the nature and speed 
of adjustment in its portfolio? (p)
Four elements in the 2008 scoreboard are not included in 
the current scoreboard.
Element (a) was also included in the 2007 version. Th  e  others 
were new with the 2008 version.
(a) Are the guidelines for fi  scal treatment generally followed 
without frequent adjustment?
(b) Does the SWF have limits on the size of its stakes?
(c) Does the SWF not take controlling stakes?
(d) Are derivatives used primarily for hedging?
Five elements in this scoreboard and the 2008 version were 
not included in the 2007 version.
(a) Are decisions on specifi   c investments made by the 
managers?
(b) Does the strategy use benchmarks?
(c) Does the strategy use credit ratings?
(d) Does the SWF have a policy on the use of leverage?
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